

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02  
SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01  
USIA-06 PRS-01 MC-02 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 AID-05  
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R 031217Z MAY 77

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3146  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USLO PEKING  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
CINCPAC  
USNATO 42

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR IN GW  
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S VISIT TO INDIA

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: FRG COUNSELOR BROCKDORFF  
REVIEWED FOR EMBOFFS THE APRIL 20-21 VISIT OF FOREIGN  
MINISTER GENSCHER TO INDIA, THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL  
WESTERN VISIT SINCE THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENTS HERE.  
GENSCHER MET WITH PM MORARJI DESAI AND  
TWICE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VAJPAYEE. HE ALSO CALLED  
ON THE PRESIDENT, DEFENSE MINISTER JAGJIVAN RAM  
AND CONGRESS PARTY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY LEADER CHAVAN.  
THE INDIANS EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN THAT THE AMERICAN  
ADMINISTRATION HAS STIFFENED ITS NUCLEAR POLICY AND  
WOULD ATTEMPT TO ALTER THE EXISTING BASIS OF INDO-US  
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NUCLEAR COOPERATION. JAGJIVAN RAM SAW NO ALTERNATIVE IN  
THE NEAR TERM TO THE ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE  
SOVIET UNION AND CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT INDIA COULD  
NOT CHANGE ITS ARMS POLICY UNLESS THE WEST CHAGED ITS  
ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARMS SUPPLY TO INDIA. THE  
GOI REITERATED ITS GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY AND  
STRESSED THERE WOULD BE NO EXCLUSIVITY IN ITS FOREIGN

RELATIONS. VAJPAYEE SAID THAT SOME SERIOUS QUESTIONS WOULD BE PUT TO SOVIET FONMIN GROMYKO ABOUT THE SOVIET'S WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT OF THE GHANDI GOVERNMENT. MR. GENSCHER STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF A STRONG NATO AS A PRECONDITION FOR DETENTE. THE INDIANS SAID THEY EANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRC BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER RELATIONS. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THE INDIANS ARGUED THEIR NEED FOR CONTINUED FOREIGN AID AND DEBT RELIEF. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

1. NUCLEAR MATTERS: REGARDING THE INDIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD US NUCLEAR POLICY, (REF A), BROCKDORFF SAID THAT "EMBITTERED" WAS TOO STRONG A WORD TO DESCRIBE THE FEELINGS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. A MORE ACCURATE DESCRIPTION, HE SAID, WOULD BE THAT THE TWO MINISTERS DEMONSTRATED "GREAT CONCERN" THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAD STIFFENED ITS NUCLEAR PLICY AND WOULD ATTEMPT TO ALTER THE EXISTING BASIS OF INDO-US NUCLEAR COOPERATION. BROCKDORFF ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE MEETING AT WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, THE FRG AMBASSADOR AND BONN FOREIGN OFFICE SOUTH ASIAN DIRECTOR LAHN DISCUSSED NUCLEAR MATTERS IN DETAIL WITH DESAI AND VAJPAYEE. BROCKDORFF IS ALSO AWARE THAT THE WORD "EMBITTERED" IS USED IN ONE OF THE REPORTS, WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY LAHN. NEVERTHELESS, BROCKDORFF BASES HIS INTERPRETATION THAT "EMBITTERED" IS TOO STRONG A WORD ON HIS SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING. US-INDIA NUCLEAR RELATIONS WERE ALSO TOUCHED UPON IN THE

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PLENARY SESSION WHICH BROCKDORFF DID ATEND. IN THIS FORUM THE DISCUSSION REFLECTED THE CONCERN OF THE INDIAN PRINCIPALS, BUT THE TALK WAS NOT AS DETAILED AND REVEALING AS THE DISCUSSION IN THE SMALLER GROUP.

2. THE INDIANS TOLD THE GERMANS THAT THEY OPPOSED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS DISCRIMINATORY. DESAI REPEATED THAT INDIAN WOULD NEVER HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN IF OTHER COUNTRIES HAD THEM. THE INDIANS ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THEY UNDERTOOK NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS ONLY IN ORDER TO EXPERIMENT WITH MATERIALS. THE INDIANS SAID THAT THEY HAD TO DO SO BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT OBTAINED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHERS. THE INDIAN SIDE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE GERMANS HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE US ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. BROCKDORFF SAID THE GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE FRG WAS FULLY PLEDGED TO A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BUT HAD TALKED WITH THE US ABOUT THE ACCESSIBILITY TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OF

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

3. ARMS SUPPLY: BROCKDORFF SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAD COME PREPARED TO DISCUSS ARMS COOPERATIONS IN SOME DETAIL, AND HAD "INTERNAL APPROVAL" TO OFFER TO SELL THREE SUBMARINES TO THE INDIANS; A COMPARABLE OFFER HAD BEEN MADE EARLIER TO PAKISTAN. BROCKDORFF, HOWEVER, DID NOT CLEARLY STATE THAT THE OFFER IN FACT HAD BEEN MADE. IN THE MEETING WITH JAGJIVAN RAM, THE DEFENSE MINISTER STRESSED THAT INDIAN NEEDS A DEPENDABLE SOURCE OF WEAPONS, A NEED WHICH EXPLAINS THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA'S OWN EXPENSIVE DEFENSE INDUSTRY. RAM SAID THAT HE EXPECTED LITTLE ALTERATION IN THE ARMS SUPPLY SITUATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR TERM, BECAUSE ON INDIA'S HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PARTS.

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HE CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT INDIA COULD NOT CHANGE ITS ARMS POLICY UNLESS THE WEST CHANGED ITS "NEGATIVE ATTITUDE" TOWARDS ARMS SUPPLY TO INDIA. RAM SAID THAT IT WAS SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONTEMPLATE SUBSTITUTING WEST EUROPE FOR THE SOVIET

UNION AS A SOURCE OF ARMS SUPPLY. "YOU MIGHT DECIDE TO CUT US OFF", HE SAID. OF COURSE, RAM SAID, ANY INVESTMENT CARRIES WITH IT IDEOLOGY; THEREFORE, INDIA WOULD GET ECONOMIC HELP FROM THE WEST AND ARMS HELP FROM THE SOVIETS AND THIS WOULD BALANCE OUT. RAM DID NOT RULE OUT FUTURE ARMS COOPERATION, AND THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THE MATTER. SOME OF THE GERMANS IN THE DELEGATION, BROCKDORFF SAID, VIEWED RAM AS AN ADVOCATE OF INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT OTHERS DISAGREED AND THOUGHT THAT RAM SAW A NEED FOR A BALANCED

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POLICY.

4. NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE USSR: IN ALL OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE INDIAN GOI LEADERS, AND OPPOSITION PARILAMENTARY PARTY LEADR AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVAN, GENSCHER WAS TOLD THAT FOREIGN PLICY HAD NOT BEEN AN ISSUE IN THE ELECTION NOR WAS IT ONE NOW. ALL STRESSED CONTINUITY IN FOREIGN PLICY, AND DESAI SPOKE OF TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT. DESAI, HOWEVER, GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CHANGE IN THE TEMPER OF FOREIGN PLICY. THE INDIANS SAID THET THERE WOULD BE NO EXCLUSIVITY IN THEIR FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND IF SUCH EXISTED IT WOULD BE CORRECTED. AS NOTE REFTEL, VAJPAYEE SAID THAT THE INDIANS WOULD PUT A FEW SERIOUS QUESTIONS TO GROMYKO DURING HIS VISIT. THE NEW GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, HAD NOT FORGOTTEN THE SOVIET'S WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT FOR INDIRA GANDHI.

5. GENSCHER MADE THE POINT HAT INDIA AND THE FRG BOTH HAD POLICIES OF PEACE, BUT THAT THEY HAD TO IMPLEMENT THESE POLICIES IN DIFFERENT WAYS. NON-ALIGNMENT WAS THE PATH FOR INDIA AND FRG RESPECTED THAT POLICY, BUT FOR THE FRG LIVING IN AN ARMED PART OF THE WORLD WHERE THERE WAS TENSION, HE SAIDN THE NATO ALLIANCE WAS NECESSARY UNLESS GERMANY WISHED TO BECOME THE PLAYTING OF THE USSR. STABIKITY AND SECURITY, HE SAID, WERE THE PRECONDITIONS OF DETENTE. IN THERI DISPATCHES, DELEGATION MEMBERS WROTE THAT THEY THOUGHT THE DESAI GOVERNMENT WAS MORE UNDERSTANDING OF THE GERMAN ALLIANCE POLICY THAT THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN, BUT BROCKDORFF COMMEN- TED THAT IN HIS VIEW THIS WAS A SOMEWHAT OPTIMISTED ASSESSMENT.

5. CHINA: FOREIGN SECRETARY JAGAT MEHTA GAVE WHAT BROCKDORFF DESCRIBED AS A PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND POSED THE QUESTION WHETHER THEIR DIFFERENCES WERE TERRITORIAL OR IDEOLOGICAL. FOR THE PAST

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TWO YEARS, MEHTA SAID, INDIA HAD BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH DIRECT ANTI-INDIAN PROPAGANDA HAD STOPPED, THE CHINESE WERE STILL TELLING VISITORS LIKE THE BANGLADESHIS AND NEPALIS THAT INDIA WAS IMPERIALIST AND EXPANSIONIST AND THAT THE USSR WAS EXPOITING INDIA. MEHTA SAID THAT INDIA WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH CHINA, BUT NOT TO THE DETRIMENT OF RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. A COMMENT BROCKDORFF TOOK TO BE A REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET UNION. AT ONE POINT MEHTA SPECULATED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF CHINA'S IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES UPON PRC CREDIBILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. MEHTA NOTED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE CHINESE ORIGINALLY LABELLED THE SOVIETS AS REVISIONISTS BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. VAJPAYEE JOINED THE SESSION AT HIS POINT AND COMMENTED THAT THE PRC STILL BELIEVED IN THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF A THIRD WORLD WAR AND IN PERMANENT REVOLUTION, AND THUS GAVE NO CHANCE TO DETENTE OR TO COMPROMISE.

6. ACCORDING TO BROCKDORFF, GENSCHER COMMENTED THAT THE PRC STILL FEARED SOVIET HEGEMONISTED DESIGNS AND SAW THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY AS PROOF OF THIS. BECAUSE THE PRC WANTED TO COUNTER SOVIET IDEOLOGY AND DIVERT SOVIET ENERGIES TO EUROPE, THE PRC SUPPORTS THE CONCEPTS OF NATO AND THE EEC. BUT FOR THE GERMANS, GENSCHER SAID, RELATIONS WITH THE PRC WERE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN TIES AND DETENTE WAS NECESSARY. GENSCHER REVIEWED THE PROGRESS IN EXCHANGE OF PEOPLES IN EUROPE BECAUSE OF DETENTE AND REEMPHASIZED THAT A STRONG NATO WAS NECESSARY FOR DETENTE TO WORK. EVEN THE EUROPEAN NON-ALIGNED, GENSCHER SAID, MEANING YUGOSLAVIA, AGREE ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT WANT TO SAY SO OPENLY. IN REFERENCE TO AFRICA THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO SPOKE ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF THE USSR TO EXPAND ITS ZONE OF INFLUENCE.

7. ECONOMIC ISSUES: THE INDIAN SIDE HAD OPENED THE TALKS BY REVIEWING THE RECENT POLITICAL CHANGES IN INDIA AT LENGTH AND

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STRESSING THAT THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PEOPLE WERE HIGH. THE JANATA PARTY HAD PLEDGED TO ERADICATE POVERTY IN TEN YEARS TIME AND THIS, THE INDIANS SAID, THEY WOULD DO THROUGH THEIR OWN RESOURCES BUT THEY ALSO NEEDED INTERNATINAL ASSISTANCE. THE INDIANS HOPED THAT THE FRG WOULD MEET ITS COMMITMENT OF RAISING ITS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO 0.7 PERCENT OF GNP BY 1980 BECAUSE THIS WOULD SERVE TO ENCOURAGE THE US, JAPAN AND OTHER EEC COUNTRIES

TO FOLLOW SUIT. REFERRING TO THEIR FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION, THE INDIANS SAID THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED FOR HAVING ACCOMPLISHED THIS POSITIONS THROUGH THEIR OWN EFFORTS, AND IN ANY CASE THE RESERVES COULD BE WIPED OUT BE SEVERAL DROUGHTS OR POOR CROPS. INDIA WOULD CONTINUE TO NEED FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR FIVE OR SIX YEARS. THEY WELCOMED THE FRG DECISION TO PUT ITS BILATERAL LENDING ON IDA TERMS BUT ASKED IF THIS COULD NOT BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED.

8. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT THE DEBT QUESTION WAS ONE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN THE CONSORTIUM, HE ALSO REFERRED TO CIED. THE INDIAN SIDE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE CIED FORUM WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DECISIONS MADE BILATERALLY AND IN THE CONSORTIA. GENSCHER ALSO SAID THAT DEBT RESCHEDULING AND RELIEF WERE NOT THE SOLUTION. THE REAL PROBLEM WAS ONE OF DIVISION OF LABOR AND INVESTMENT. HE NOTED THAT INDIA'S LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS WERE AN IMPEDIMENT TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT. THE INDIANS RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE NO IMPEDIMENTS. THE UPSHOT WAS THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO ESTABLISH ANOTHER JOINT COMMISSION.

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## Message Attributes

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